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RESERVATION OF EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION.
In considering the reservation of an easement by implica-
tion, it is first necessary to differentiate between an implied res-
ervation and an implied grant. Although there is no express
grant of an easement, and easement is frequently construed as
arising in connection with a conveyance of land, either for the
benefit of the land conveyed as against land retained by the
grantor, or against the land conveyed, the former being an im-
plied grant, the latter an implied reservation.' Thus where the
owner conveys the dominant tenement without expressly grant-
ing the easement, there is an implied grant, and where the ser-
vient tenement is conveyed, there is an implied reservation. The
courts are prone to look with disfavor upon implying reserva-
tions of easements, since the grantor cannot derogate from his
own grant.2 The grantor in conveying the land, being familiar
with the condition of the land, should expressly reserve to the
land retained, any easements which are served by the land con-
veyed, and further that the grantee has a right to depend on the
contract of conveyance.3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals lines
up with this new holding, that since a grantor cannot derogate
from his own grant, while a grantee may take the language of
the deed most strongly in his favor, the law will imply an ease-
ment in favor of a grantee more readily than it will in favor
of a grantor.4 The courts are also much more lenient in constru-
ing the requirements for an implied grant than those for an im-
plied *reservation. For example, "necessary" has been construed
in case of an implied grant, as meaning only "highly desir-
able" or "convenient' 5 while in implying a reservation, "nec-
essary" is construed as meaning "absolutely necessary" to the
benefit of the land retained.6
II Tiffany, Real Property 1270.
'Buffie7d v. Brown, 4 De G. J. & S. 185 (1863).
Supra.
'Himley Coal Co. v. Kirk, 266 S. W. (Ky.) 355 (1924).
"Brown v. Alabaster, 37 Ch. D. (Eng.) 490 (1887).
6Hildreth v. Goggins, 91 Me. 227 (1898), where the court held that
If there was a way out of land, even though by way of the ocean, an-
other way out over land was not necessary, and thus the court would
not imply a reservation. Although this construction of the word is
too strict and not generally followed, it is a good example of the ex-
treme length to which a court will go to avoid implying a reservation.
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The earlier English cases would imply reservations of ease-
ments corresponding to pre-existing quasi easements, 7 that is,
where the owner of the land had used one part of the land for
the benefit of another. The latter cases, however, have repudi-
ated this doctrine. In Suffield v. Browns, the Chancellor in re-
fusing to allow the reservation of an easement, said,
"It seems to me to be more reasonable and just to hold
that, if the grantor intends to reserve any right over the prop-
erty granted, it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant,
rather than cut down and limit the operation of a plain grant,
by the fiction of an implied reservation."
However, despite this language the court implied that recip-
rocal easements and easements of necessity could still be im-
pliedly reserved. This strict view was modified in a later case 9
in which the court held they would imply a reservation where
the easement reserved was a corporal part, as well as necessary
and reciprocal.
The general American rule is essentially the same as the
English rule, the courts will not imply the reservation of an
easement except in cases of necessity.' 0 Some jurisdictions say
that an easement will be implied by reservation only in cases of
strict necessity." However, it is submitted that in several juris-
dictions the rule is not so strict, and that a reservation will be
implied where it is highly necessary, obvious, and apparent.'
2
One court said that to raise an implied reservation of an ease-
ment, the existing servitude must be apparent, strictly neces-
sary, and continuous. The rule of "strictly necessary" is not
limited to strict necessity but to, reasonable necessity, as dis-
tinguished from convenience.' 3 However, this is not general,
and even though the easement may be reasonably necessary, the
courts will not impliedly raise it.
The Kentucky courts, although modifying the general rule,
tend to only imply reservations when such easements are highly
IPyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N. 916 (1857), II Tiff. Real Prop. 1292.8 Supra, note 2.
9 Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Co., 2 Ch. D. 557 (1902).
0 II Tiffany, Real Property 1293.
'Brown v. Fuller, 130 N. W. (Mich.) 62 (1911); Dobney v. Child,
48 So. (Miss.) 897 (1909); Hawley v. Chafee, 93 Atl. (Vt.) 120 (1915);
Cahrey v. Willis, 7 Atl. (Mass.) 364 (1863), 12 C. J. 920, N. 75.
2 So. Pac. Ry. Co. v. L. H. Milling Co., 170 Pac. 829 (1913), II Tiff.
Real Prop. 1295.
13Miller v. Skaggs, 91 S. E. (W. Va.) 536 (1917).
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beneficial to the land, and there is no other reasonable mode of
enjoying the dominant tenement.' 4 Thus they do not construe the
term "necessity" as strictly as the majority of American courts.
It is submitted that the term "necessary" in Kentucky is con-
strued as the court in Todnun v. Jones,15 held that they would
impliedly reserve all obvious and apparent and continuous ease-
ments, being reasonably necessary for the use of the land. In
adopting this broad view, the courts have overruled an earlier
case10 in which the court, citing Jones on Easements, said,
"There is no implied reservation of an easement in case one
sells a part of his land over which he has previously exercised a
burden unless the burden is apparent, continuous, and strictly
necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained. A man cannot,
after he has absolutely conveyed the land, retain the use of it for
any purpose whatever without an express reservation. A reser-
vation of an easement will be implied only in cases of strictest
necessity."
Ways of necessity are generally cases where the grantor has
conveyed the land all around the parcel which he retains, and is
thus land-locked, the only way out being over the land of
strangers. In such cases the general rule in England is that
the courts will imply a way out over the land granted, as being
a way of necessity.
17
In America, the majority of jurisdictions line up with the
English view as to ways of necessity, holding that where there
is a conveyance of land so as to cut off the grantor from access
to that conveyed there arises a presumption of a right of way
across the portion granted.' 8 Necessary in these cases usually
means the same as in the other kind of easements, not strictly
necessary, but reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the
land,") and such a way will be implied as long as the necessity
,,McGurn v. L. & N. Ry., 198 S. W. (Ky.) 222 (1917).
5202 S. W. (Ky.) 662 (1918).
16Tebus v. Boston, 51 S. W. (Ky.) 609 (1889). Although these
cases are, in fact, concerned with ways out of land, in opinions the
courts rendered dicta to the effect that they would imply an easement
by reservation, provided these conditions existed.
a' II Tiff. Real Prop. 1298.
1 Hickman v. GoZeaday, 149 N. E. (Ind.) 375 (1925); Wiese v.
Thien, 214 S. W. (Mo.) 853; Moore v. White, 124 N. W. (Mich.) 62
(1909), holding that a way over another man's land may be impliedly
granted as well as reserved.
19 Miles v. Bodenheim, 193 S. W. (Tex.) 693 (1917).
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exists. 20  Since the courts will imply a reservation of a way of
necessity, it is immaterial as to which was first disposed of by
the common owner, the dominant or the servient tenement.
2 1
In Kentucky "ways of necessity" may be impliedly re-
served, although the deed is silent on that matter. Thus where
the grantor had conveyed land and expressly reserved a grave-
yard therefrom, to which there was a road, from the public high-
way, over the land granted, the land conveyed entirely surround-
ing it. The grantee refused to allow the grantor to use it. The
court in deciding that the grantor had impliedly reserved the
roadway, said,
"Leading from grave-yard to public road was a well-de-
fined road way, which had been in long and continuous use in
going to and from the grave-yard. Not only this, but the way
from the grave-yard across the land of the grantee is indis-
putably necessary. Under these circumstances, we will imply a
reservation, although the deed is silent on the matter.' '22
However, it seems that "indispensably necessary" is the
test for determining reservation of an easement by implication,
since where the grantor sought to go over a portion of land
granted, which was more convenient, the other way being less
accessible, the court would not allow the implication of the res-
ervation, on the theory that it was not strictly necessary.23 The
law will also imply a reservation, where the easement is appar-
ent and the necessity still existing.24 Thus a court will imply a
reservation of an easement, where such an easement is visible,
apparent, and indispensably necessary. However, a parol agree-
ment to the contrary, will defeat such an implication.
25
The general rule of implied reservations is, however, devi-
ated from in the case of reciprocal easements; the English rule
being that when buildings are erected together by the same
owner, in such a way as to obviously require mutual support,
and he thereafter conveys one of them, the grantee is regarded
as impliedly giving the grantor a right of support, for the house
'0Meredith v. Frank, 47 N. E. (Ohio) 656 (1897).
21 11 Tiff. Real Prop. 1299.
=Stamper v. McNabb, 189 S. W. (Ky.) 216 (1916); also Irvine v.
McCreary, 56 S. W. (Ky.) 966 (1900).
'5onrad v. Smith, 261 S. W. (Ky.) 1103 (1924); McGurn v. L. &
N. Ry., 198 S. W. (Ky.) 222 (1917).
24Grider v. Glass, 267 S. W. (Ky.) 609 (1925).
'5 Lebus v. Boston, supra.
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retained by him in consideration of support impliedly granted
for the house sold.2 6 The only instance of reciprocal easements
being that one stated above.
The rule in America is the same as stated above where one
builds houses separated by a partition wall and the houses are
afterwards conveyed to different parties the division line run-
ning longitudinally through the wall, each house is entitled to
an easement of support 27 from the wall.
There is, in Kentucky, a diversion in one case from the gen-
eral rule. The court held that where two parties, own an
adjoining party wall, one may, by due notice to the other and
using reasonable care to sustain the wall, remove it from support.
If the party has followed the above stated qualifications, even
though the other's building would fall, the person removing
the support would not be liable.28  However, in a later case
29
where there was a party wall, the fact that one could not take
away the support or alter the wall so as to effect the other party,
the court did not speak of reciprocal easements, but based the
decision on implied agreement, which had the same effect as a
reciprocal easement. Thus there are no reciprocal easements in
Kentucky, and there can be no implied reservation thereof,
although it might be argued that such an implied agreement, is
in fact a reciprocal easement, it seems that such construction is
too general.
WARREN GAnLAnD.
II Tiff. Real Prop. 1294.
' Supra, note 26.
', Clemens v. Speed, 19 S. W. (Ky.) 660 (1892).
'Bright v. J. Bacon & Sons, 116 S. W. 268 (Ky.) (1909).
